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News sensitivity and the cross-section of stock returns
Abstract
The paper is the first one outside the high-frequency domain to use sentiment-signed news to
directly compare news and no-news stock returns. This is done by estimating whether returns
on positive, neutral and negative news days are significantly different from the average daily
return for a large sample of US stocks over the period from January 2003 to August 2010. The
general results show that positive news days indeed have above-average returns and negative
news days returns are below average, while the neutral news days are economically barely
distinguishable from the average. The market also proves to be fast and accurate at pricing
new information, as there are no signs of drift shortly after news days. On the contrary, a
directionally correct and statistically significant movement can be found on the day before the
news day. The cross-sectional analysis reveals significant differences in the strength of market
reactions between stocks ranked on size, book-to-market or news coverage. The general results
however hold across all subsamples and are also not driven by earnings announcements or
past stock returns. Moreover, the average news sensitivity is itself a priced source of risk. A
portfolio of stocks with high sensitivity to news outperforms a portfolio of stocks with low
sensitivity by a statistically and economically significant 0.84% per month. This news premium
seems to primarily relate to the high impact of news in situations of general uncertainty.
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The stock market is one of the most information-intensive environments and trad-
ing is largely information-driven. There is however less accord concerning the source of
this information, is it rather public or private. The question is especially relevant for
company-specific information, where the potential for insider relationships is the great-
est. Maintaining equal access to information has been advocated as an important aspect
of the level playing field for investors and with ad-hoc publicity rules in place and nu-
merous communication channels there are presently thousands of news announcements
released around the world every day.
The natural way to resolve this issue would be to test the price impact, whenever a
new piece of private or public information arrives. This paper gives a partial answer by
analyzing public information in a comprehensive way. Such information can be better
identified, so direct tests of its price impact are in principle possible. The ideal test
requires the knowledge of: (1) whether the ex ante content of the information was posi-
tive or negative, and (2) what were the market expectations. A measure of expectations
is important because in standard asset pricing theory only information different from
expected can impact the price. In practice, directly measuring the expectations of the
market as a whole proves impossible and proxies are needed.
For quantitative information, like earnings, it is straightforward to satisfy the first
requirement, insofar as earnings growth and anything that contributes to it is good. The
arrival of most of such quantitative information is scheduled in advance, so there are also
readily available, up to date proxies of expectations, like consensus estimates of stock
analysts. Measures of the unexpected fraction of earnings, like SUE, are also available.
A similar approach also works for macroeconomic releases. Consequently, the literature
analyzing the impact of quantitative information is immense. A survey by Yu (2009)
cites more than twenty studies of the post-earnings announcements drift (PEAD) alone.
However, it has been long suggested that qualitative information matters too, even
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if it only accompanies quantitative information, like the actual text of an earnings an-
nouncement. Much more such qualitative information is transmitted in the form of
analysts reports and ad hoc announcements about company events. The problem here
is that there is no immediate value for good and bad anymore, because such information
is transmitted as unstructured text. Such a value must first be computed and borrowing
from computer linguistics one could talk of opinion mining or sentiment analysis where
the aim is to determine whether the author of the text meant to express a positive or
negative opinion about whatever the subject of the text was. As such it has long been
the focus of communication and content analysis, relatively new is the widespread use of
automatic algorithms to scan the texts. Research on automated sentiment analysis has
recently been very prolific, helped by increasing computational power and the demand
to incorporate the vast universe of online communication1, and different methods have
been developed. An excellent and largely still up to date survey is provided by Pang
and Lee (2008).
The approach that first made its way into the finance literature treats a text as
a ”bag of words” and the sentiment score is based on the frequency certain words,
defined by the researcher, appear in it. Li (2006) focuses on the words ”risk” and
”uncertain” in company annual reports. Davis et al. (2006) count words from texts
of earnings announcements which fall into certain categories, defined in the DICTION
dictionary, associated with positive and negative language. Similarly, Tetlock (2007)
uses the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary to determine the fraction of negative words in a pop-
ular Wall Street Journal column and Tetlock et al. (2008) extend this approach to all
company-specific news from the WSJ and Dow Jones Newswire archive. All of these
paper show that measures of language are significant in explaining returns and changes
in fundamentals, independently of quantitative factors.
1Early adopters of this technology included Holywood producers interested in online film reviews.
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The ”bag of words” approach, though praised for its simplicity and reliability, has
some important limitations. From an information processing viewpoint, it is not clear
that the frequency of words really determines the sentiment of text. On one hand, Pang
et al. (2002) show that the presence of certain words can be a better indicator than
frequency. Otherwise, it is also easy to construct examples where the order of the words
is decisive. Even more importantly perhaps, treating a text as a collection of words tells
nothing about the relationships between them. The next generation text reading algo-
rithms therefore aim also at extracting these relationships, identifying words within the
subject-predicate-object syntax. Such algorithms can be either deductive, meaning they
follow explicit rules on how to parse the text which have to be defined in advance, or in-
ductive in which case a learning set of evaluated texts has to be supplied from which the
algorithm attempts to read the rules applied to all subsequent items. Both approaches
can also be combined. In a finance setting it might be reasonable to predefine the list of
potential subjects, company names for instance, and let the algorithm determine what
is being said about each of them. In any case, improvements in accuracy achievable
by introducing syntax are significant. Also, contrary to what is sometimes said, syn-
tactic approaches are not any more subjective than ”bag of words”. In fact, surveys of
methods of content analysis assign all of them to the family of ”supervised approaches”,
indicating human involvement in their design. This is because the dictionaries, which
are behind any ”bag of words” analysis have to be created by humans. Even inductive
algorithms offer a fair degree of inter-subjective reliability, because the learning sets are
always evaluated by more than one person and the results of learning are only accepted
when the agreement between the instructors and the machine but also among the in-
structors themselves reaches a certain, appropriately high threshold. The sophistication
of syntactic algorithms is in a sense limiting in that they rarely work outside the topic
area for which they were originally developed, simply due to the differences in language
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used e.g. in political debate and online product reviews. This should not be a major
concern for analyzing company news however, because they are a rather well defined
group and thanks to established styles of reporting also not prone to sudden changes of
language over time.
In the financial industry, Thomson Reuters was the first to apply a state-of-the-
art text reading algorithm to its own extensive archive of company-specific newswire
messages, as they appeared on traders’ screens, going back to January 2003. It is
arguably representative of the timely, public information available at least to professional
investors, i.e. public news. Each message is assigned an exact timestamp and a list of
companies it mentions. The subsequent content analysis takes place at company level,
so there are as many scores per message, as there were mentioned companies. The first
score is the relevance of the message for each company, which gives and indication of
how often and how prominently it was mentioned. The centerpiece of the analysis is
the probability of the author sentiment being positive, neutral or negative. In a finance
setting it is important to stress the advantages of focusing on the author rather than the
recipients of the message. Focusing on the recipients, financial investors in that case,
would in the extreme lead to classifying as good those news, which moved the market
up and as bad news those, which moved the market down. Such a news measure would
be obviously endogenous. To the extent that the authors of newswire messages, some
three thousands Reuters journalists, are not purely driven by past stock performance,
author sentiment has a claim on exogeneity.
Earlier studies using this data have covered three topics. Groß-Klußman and Hautsch
(2010) focus on the instantaneous impact of public news using high-frequency data. They
find strong responses in volatility, volume and liquidity measures and a mixed picture
for returns. Storkenmaier et al. (2011) also construct measures of intraday liquidity and
trading activity but focus on comparing the averages for negative and positive news days
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to no-news days. They find that liquidity is significantly lower on negative news days
but not significantly higher on positive ones. Trading activity always increases on news
days, regardless of the sentiment. Finally, Sinha (2010) uses news sentiment to calculate
monthly sentiment scores for individual stocks, which are then used to construct ”news
momentum” portfolios. Interestingly, the information contained in past news sentiment
is shown to subsume information contained in past returns.
I take a different approach based on constructing a daily history of public news for
a representative sample of US stocks and focusing on daily returns. Using the Thomson
Reuters News Analytics archive, each day for every stock in the sample is assigned to
one of four categories: no-news day, positive-news day, neutral-news day or negative-
news day. In case of multiple news items on the same day, the prevailing sentiment is
computed as a weighted average of the individual sentiments. Then, a panel regression
is estimated to test whether public news systematically impacts returns, that is whether
returns on news days are significantly different from returns on no-news days, taking
into account stock-specific differences. It turns out that they are and the estimated
differences between the average news day and no-news day return, which I will call news
sensitivities, are both large and in line with the news sentiment: +45bps for positive
news days and -43bps for negative news days. This is not trivial, since it is neither
given that public news indeed conveys new information to the markets nor that author
sentiment is a good indicator of market reaction.
Contemporaneous returns have also been neglected in a string of papers on news
impact (Chan (2003), Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), Tetlock (2010) and Tetlock (2011)),
which all use returns in news-related time periods (months, weeks or days) to predict
future returns. At the same time it would be important to know whether the content
of the news had any immediate impact on the stock price in the first place. One likely
reason for this ommission is that the news data employed in those studies was not
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sentiment-signed, so there was no obvious way to design a test of market reaction, given
that positive and negative news should have different impact. Using absolute returns is a
dangerous way around this problem, since it is biased towards finding significant results.
To see how, assume that positive news should have positive market impact. In empirical
data one is also likely to find cases, where positive news was associated with negative
returns.2 When using raw returns these cases would be correctly classified as ”wrong”,
i.e. contradicting the initial hypothesis. An analogous argument can be constructed for
negative news. When using absolute returns however, all returns are put on one side
and the ”wrong” cases mixed with the ”right” ones.
The issue of news content and contemporaneous returns was mentioned by Tetlock
et al. (2008), who measure the news content by the standardized fraction of negative
words in the text. An increase of one standard deviation in this measure corresponds
to an 8bps drop in return. Once only news about earnings are considered, the impact
grows to around 32bps. These results are conditional on there being news on a given day
in the first place. Separately, they show an event-study type plot of abnormal returns
around news days but do not comment on the statistical significance of these returns.
The only study, which to my best knowledge directly attempted to compare news and
no-news returns dates back to well before the age of text-reading algorithms. Thompson
et al. (1987) perform the monumental task of hand-collecting one-year’s worth of mes-
sages from the Wall Street Journal Index and assigning them to companies and topic
groups. The problem with their results is that they are based on parametric t-test,
which rely on the independence and normality of observations, both of which are most
likely not true when comparing news and no-news returns. They also did not have any
means of determining news sentiment.
Apart from contemporaneous reactions I also look at an event window before and
2This must not be a weakness of the sentiment scoring tool but rather evidence of factors different
from the language content playing a role in determining the market reaction.
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after the news day in order to measure the extent news anticipation and the speed of
its incorporation. It turns out that prices move up (down) already one day before a
positive (negative) news day but only a fraction of the total impact is incorporated.
There is no identifiable move before a neutral news day. Investors are therefore able to
correctly assess the directional impact of upcoming news but not its magnitude. On the
other hand, the post-news event window does not reveal any significant drift or reversal,
except for a few isolated cases, which suggests that markets are fast and accurate in
incorporating public news. It also means that news is not just short-term noise, where
prices promptly return to their earlier level, but has persistent impact.
The contemporaneous effect persist across a range of cross-sectional breakdowns. The
approach here is to divide stocks into quintiles based on market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio, trading volume, volatility and news coverage and run the panel regression
in each quintile separately. The most important finding is that the news reactions found
in the whole sample are not confined to any special subset. In fact, because the the
distribution of news is highly skewed towards a relatively narrow group of companies,
most cross-sectional subsamples have larger average news sensitivities that the whole
sample. Notwithstanding, the analysis uncovers a fair deal of heterogeneity. The news
sensitivities are greatest among smaller, less liquid and more volatile stocks, where the
magnitude of the average daily news sensitivities is well above 1%. Interestingly, in-
frequent news is also associated with stronger reactions, largely independently of other
company characteristics. This fits nicely with limited attention models in that investors
bombarded with news become less sensitive to it.
In this context it is particularly interesting to look at how news impact changes
during the financial crisis. It turns out that investors react more strongly to news
during this period, indicating that they pay more attention to them. Interestingly, the
crisis also increases the polarity in the sense that positive news days are associated with
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even higher returns and the opposite is true for negative news days.
However, reactions to news are not only relevant for same-day returns. Differentiating
stocks based on their average news sensitivity produces a significant premium, with high
news sensitivity stocks earning 84bps per month in excess of low news sensitivity stocks,
after traditional risk factors are controlled for. Intuitively, stocks which react more
strongly in the face of uncertain future news, are less predictable and thus riskier for
investors. The intuition is confirmed by the fact that the news sensitivity premium
is the strongest among stocks with already high uncertainty, proxied by idiosyncratic
volatility. Interestingly, past news sentiment is largely irrelevant for the news premium,
even though it would be reasonable to assume that investors are mostly concerned with
sensitivity to the downside.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It shows in a comprehensive
fashion that even in the presence of market expectations and private channels of infor-
mation, both of which are impossible to control for, public news still plays a significant
role in the stock market, impacting both short and long-term returns. In the short-term
framework it is the first to directly compare returns on positive and negative news days
and explore the heterogeneity across company characteristics, industries as well as the
special case of the financial crisis. In the context of long-term returns it is the second
one after Fang and Peress (2009) to find a risk premium measure directly based on the
media. Compared to their paper it goes one step further in that not only the occurrence
of the news is considered but also its impact. Moreover, the paper confirms that a ”face
value” assessment of news content, based only on an analysis of language, is already a
good indicator of the market interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data in
greater detail. Sections II and III deal with the empirical findings on short and long-term
impact respectively. Section IV is devoted to robustness checks, while Section V looks
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specifically at the impact of the financial crisis. Section VI concludes.
I Data
The data on news come from Thomson Reuters News Analytics, which is an algo-
rithmic text-reading tool. Its two main components are: a real-time news and news
metadata feed, suitable for automated news-driven trading, and a systematically up-
dated archive, at the time of writing spanning the period January 2003 - August 2010
and containing more than 12 million news item for about 16’000 stocks worldwide. The
inputs are all company-specific news items coming over the Reuters newswire, which are
then described with more than 40 pieces of metadata. The most important of those are:
• identifier of the company mentioned in the news
• timestamp, indicating the news arrival to millisecond precision
• sentiment, a discrete variable indicating whether the news was positive (+1), neu-
tral (0) or negative (-1). This is determined based on a purely linguistic analysis
of text and does not in particular contain any form of market feedback
• relevance, a continuous variable on the (0;1] interval indicating how prominently
the company was mentioned in the news. A relevance score of one generally indi-
cates the company was mentioned directly in the headline
• sentiment probabilities, this set of three variables adding up to one shows the
probability of assigning each of the possible sentiments to the news item (the one
eventually assigned is the one with the highest probability) and thus, intuitively,
a positive news with a probability of 0.8 can be seen as more clearly positive than
one with a probability of 0.4
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• novelty, which shows whether there have been preceding news in any of the five
predefined time windows, ranging from six hours to five days
• topic code, a set of predefined Thomson Reuters codes (the full list contains more
than 4’000 items), which together give an idea of the subject matter or, in the
parlance of news analytics, ”aboutness” of the news
It is important to stress that the meaning of news sentiment in this setting is not
related to investor mood as in the usual sense. In particular, a news item might be
assigned positive sentiment, because it indeed conveys important favorable information
about a company or because it uses enthusiastic language. The latter ”over-reactionist”
component is however mitigated by comprehensive rules being in place at Thomson
Reuters, which govern the wording of news announcements. Therefore, I tend to assume
that significant reactions to news are due to their informational content and not just
language.
As the equity universe I use the constituents of the Datastream US Total Market
Index, which consists of both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, representing roughly 90%
of market capitalization. Datastream is used because it is most compatible with news
database, also provided by Thomson Reuters. Ince and Porter (2006) point out certain
issues related to using equity returns data from Datastream, most notably the fact
that Datastream equity constituent lists contain other instruments than common stock.
Fortunately, these concerns mostly impact small stocks, which do not enter into my
sample (the smallest stocks in my sample correspond roughly to the fourth decile in
Fama-French dataset), however, I still attempt to address them. Similarly to what has
been suggested, I manually filter the list of companies, eliminating those that contain
terms such as ”ADR” or ”Pref” in the NAME datatype.
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Most importantly, I only retain stocks which had at least one news day in any given
year. The sample contains 780 stocks in the first year and grows to almost 950 towards
the end reflecting improving news coverage over this period. It is biased towards large
cap stocks but this was necessary to ensure they have sufficient news. For each stock in
the sample I retrieve its history of news announcement, recording the timestamp, the
sentiment and the three sentiment probabilities. To be included, the news had to arrive
at least two hours before the close and be ”novel”, i.e. have no precedents in any of
the predefined time windows. No differentiation was made relating to whether the news
mentioned single or multiple stocks, what kind of release it was or the topic. Depending
on news specification I either use a relevance filter of 1 (leaving in only headline news)
or no filter at all.
Subsequently, I multiply the sentiment of each news item with its probability and in
the case of multiple news per day, compute a weighted average (where weights are the
sentiment probabilities) to obtain the prevailing sentiment for that day:
avg sent =
∑
1 · probpos +
∑
(−1) · probneg
npos + nneut + nneg
∈ [−1; 1] (1)
A news day is considered as positive if its weighted average sentiment is greater than
0.33, as negative if it is less than -0.33 and as neutral if it is in between. Therefore,
although neutral news items do not enter the sentiment calculation in the numerator
of the above expression (due to their sentiment of 0) their number shows up in the
denominator pushing the overall score downward, so that a day with many neutral
news items would still be classified as neutral. This procedure generally replicates rules
applied to individual news items. Repeating it for each stock I obtain a complete history
of news days and their respective sentiment classification.
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For each stock in the sample I also collect the daily return, the daily market capital-
ization, the daily trading volume, the market to book ratio as of end of each year and
the industry code based on the IBC ten industry groups classification. Panel A of Table
I shows the relevant summary statistics in yearly breakdown. As mentioned before, the
median stock is fairly big but this is important to guarantee that from the beginning of
the sample period most stocks have at least some news days. Over the last three years
this is the case for basically all of them. The average number of news days per stock
also increases with time, meaning that the informational environment becomes more
dense. Looking at the sentiment breakdown, the majority of companies feature news
days of each type in any given year, though neutral news days are slightly more frequent,
followed by positive ones. Even during the crisis years (2008 and 2009) negative news
days are consistently the smallest group in terms of number of stocks receiving them.
However, the average per stock is higher for negative than for positive news days during
those years, meaning that some companies (presumably financial ones) had noticeably
skewed proportions of news days at that time.
Table I around here
It is also worth noting, that news coverage is far from being uniform across stocks.
Looking ahead at the topmost panel of Table III, there are large difference between
quintiles of stocks ranked by total news coverage. The average stock in the top quintile
has about ten times as much news days per year as in the lowest one. Although the
companies in the top news coverage quintile are bound to be bigger and of more interest
to investors, this fact also raises questions about the information content of such frequent
news. I return to this issue in the middle part of the empirical section.
Besides using all news, I also consider different news specifications, which are sum-
marized in Panel C of Table I. The left hand side reports the average number of news
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day per stock and per year for each sentiment group and the right hand side the cor-
responding average sentiments, which are conditional on the news day belonging to the
respective sentiment group. Thus the possible range of sentiment for a positive news
day is between 0.33 and 1. One dimension I use is the relevance of the news, where
I distinguish between highly relevant (and visible) ”headline” news and the rest. For
some news days, those which previously featured both headline and non-headline news,
this might mean a reclassification to a different sentiment category, as now only head-
line news on those days are used to calculate the weighted sentiments. That is why
the average news numbers in rows 2 and 3 only add up to the number in row 1 for
the ”Total” column. In general, there are more news days with headlines than without,
so concentrating only on the former does not lead to a dramatic loss of data (roughly
one third). On the second dimension of specification I focus only on news days with
extreme sentiment, which is defined as sentiment in excess of 0.5 in magnitude. This
leads to a further loss of data (in particular neutral news is dropped, since it would be
awkward to define ”extremely neutral” sentiment) but especially for headline news it
is rather limited. It seems that a vast majority of headline news days have a clear cut
sentiment anyway. The corresponding average sentiments also change only slightly. It is
also important to note that neutral news days make up a large fraction of the news day
population in all specifications, in which they are included. Therefore, isolating neutral
news, matters greatly for any assessment of news impact.
II Short term impact of news on stock prices
In order to examine the impact of news on returns on a short-term basis, I estimate
a panel regression of daily returns on the news day dummies:
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ri,t = βM ·rM,t+
3∑
k=−3
δposk ·Newsposi,t−k+
3∑
k=−3
δneutk ·Newsneuti,t−k+
3∑
k=−3
δnegk ·Newsnegi,t−k+i,t (2)
The incidence of news anticipation and post-news drift can be judged based on an
event window of three days before and after the news day. Additionally, I control for
the contemporaneous market return to eliminate any beta effect. The panel approach is
best suited for this type of analysis, because it estimates the incremental impact of news,
on top of the given company’s average return. Its merits for analyzing daily differences
have been shown in the study by Patton and Verardo (2010) on daily betas around
earnings announcements, to which my study is methodologically similar. The resulting
parameter estimates on the dummy variables should be interpreted as differences between
the average return on a given day during the event window and the average daily return
outside the event window. I will refer to them as news sensitivities. Another advantage
of this approach is that systematic differences in returns between stocks are absorbed
by the panel.
The significance of the estimates can be judged by the related t-statistics, which are
robust to clustering across the time and stock dimensions. This is important because
both the persistence in the news reactions of particular stocks (firm effect) and spillovers
in the sense of news about one stock also affecting other stocks (time effect) can lead
to correlated residuals. Moreover, neither of these effects needs to be uniform, meaning
that the firm effect may be time-varying and the spillovers can only affect a subgroup of
stocks rather than all of them. Including dummy variables for stocks and time periods is
not sufficient in that case, since it still leads to biased standard errors (Petersen (2009)).
To avoid these issues, I employ the sandwich estimator of Cameron et al. (2006) 3, which
3I would like to thank the authors for making their code available online
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allows for arbitrary two-dimensional clustering. In the first dimension each company is
an individual cluster, in the second, time, dimension, the size of the cluster is set to one
day.
Working with daily aggregates means that whatever happens intraday is not looked
at. Although the high-frequency analysis of Groß-Klußman and Hautsch (2010) shows
that stock prices move after news, there might also be significant intra-day anticipation
(Ranaldo (2007)). In general, anticipation does not invalidate my results as long as the
measured returns are still attributable to the news and not to other factors. In other
words, the analysis makes sense as long as the news is instrumental to and not just
coincidental with the returns. For earlier studies, using monthly or weekly time windows
to relate news and returns, it is arguably a serious problem. Daily window is less prone to
such concerns. A more serious issue might arise if news would only ex post describe what
has already happened in the market, so called ”no content” news. Although I cannot
guarantee eliminating such news (it is anyway a contentious issue, what constitutes
content, given market expectations) but I try to minimize their influence. On one hand,
relying on newswire items, as opposed to print media or online news, is in itself a partial
remedy, since the main purpose of the newswire is to deliver real-time factual information
to investors. Otherwise, filtering for maximum novelty should eliminate repetitive items,
while focusing on high relevance should eliminate collective articles, which for instance
merely quote the performance of some stocks. Finally, truncating the news flow before
the market close filters out the wave of daily market commentaries and reports, which
tend to be clustered in the afternoon.
A Baseline results
The results summarized in Table II first of all show the perils of analyzing news
without regard to their sentiment. In the first column, where all news days are pooled
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together, the results are hardly meaningful, despite being statistically significant. Focus-
ing only on headlines does not improve the situation. The estimated news sensitivities
are in fact very similar to those for neutral news days. This is most likely due to the
fact that as was shown before, the positive and negative news days are roughly equal in
numbers.
Table II around here
Only after separating between positive and negative news days the results become
truly meaningful (Figure 1). Doing this reveals that news sensitivities agree with the
prevailing sentiment of the news and are highly statistically and economically significant.
Headlines are associated with clearly larger news sensitivities, while non-headlines are
not very important. This means that results for all news are mainly driven by the most
visible items, so the salience of news seems to play a big role. On the other hand,
extreme sentiment does not seem to add much to the initial sensitivities on positive
or negative news days. Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact is roughly equal for
positive and negative news days. The ”bad is stronger than good” effect, frequently cited
in psychology, is not found here. Given the large and roughly equal number of positive
and negative news days and the fact that the average sentiment is roughly equal in
both cases, it would be hard to suggest systematically different content of positive and
negative news. The results indeed are a strong indication that the ”negativeness” as
such does not affect the pricing of news.
Looking at the event window before the news days shows that the market is able
to correctly anticipate the direction of the news but only a fraction of its total impact.
This is evidence of either only partial information leakage or the fact that the population
of better-informed insiders, at least those that have a lead of a whole trading day, is
relatively small. It also seems that the market is quick and accurate in pricing new
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information, as there are basically not significantly different than average returns after
the news days, apart from a few instances of reversal of rather minor magnitude.
B Cross-sectional analysis
To account for the heterogeneity of news impact, I re-estimate the panel regression
in (2) for quintiles of stocks sorted according to various company characteristics. A sec-
ondary goal of the cross-sectional analysis is to verify that the results from the previous
section are not driven by any specific subset of stocks, thus the sorts follow the risk
factor literature. Apart from the most commonly used size and book-to-market ratio,
they also include liquidity, volatility and news coverage. Separately, I do an industry
comparison based on the IBC industry group classification, which is the highest level
classification consisting of ten broad categories. For the sake of compactness, I only use
the headline news specification in the cross-sectional analysis, since headlines seem to
drive the overall news impact.
Table III around here
At the end of each year stocks are sorted into quintiles based on the respective
characteristic. The assignments are pooled across years and used to estimate the news
impact. This effectively means adopting a backward-looking perspective, which I do
to make sure that stocks do not change into a different quintile during the estimation
period. The results are very similar if the year following quintile formation is used
instead. Due to using end-of-year breakpoints, the analysis covers the period 2003 -
2009. Finally, only the estimates for the news day itself are reported to conserve space,
given that no substantial effects could be found in the rest of the event window4.
4Full results are available upon request.
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Sorting on news coverage as a risk factor is motivated by the findings of Fang and
Peress (2009) that stocks neglected by the media earn higher average returns. They
suggest that their argument only applies to the general media, like newspapers, which
do not transmit what they call ”genuine news”, however coverage is arguably also the
feature of channels like the newswire. For instance, Caterpillar and Alcoa are companies
of similar size and both are constituents of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index,
yet Alcoa had roughly 50% more news days over the sample period. It seems that the
differences in the number of newswire reports are not entirely due to differences in actual
news events. Therefore, I use the total number of news days in a given year to group
stocks into quintiles of news coverage (Panel A in Tables III and IV). The quintile
means show that the distribution of news days is indeed highly skewed. In fact, stocks
in the upper quintile receive almost as many news days as all other quintiles combined
(47 vs 57 per stock per year on average). Although no direct measure is available,
I tend to interpret infrequent news as having higher informational content. Indirect
evidence in provided by the much stronger market reactions to infrequent news, which
are roughly four times larger in the bottom quintile than in the top one (1.45% vs 0.35%
for positive and -1.55% vs -0.39% for negative news days). However, frequent news still
has meaningful impact.
Table IV around here
Sorting on size is based on the average daily market capitalization, computed as the
product of closing price and number of shares outstanding. Small stocks have signifi-
cantly less news days than large ones and the effect is also quite persistent, with the
second largest quintile having just over half the number of the top quintile. To the
extent that the number of news days increases monotonically with size, it raises the
question whether sorting on size is any different to sorting on news coverage but in fact
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only 38% of the stocks are assigned to the same quintile in both cases. Nevertheless,
the fact that only big news about small stocks tend to get published likely plays a role
in explaining while small stocks react so much more strongly on news days (1.65% vs
0.36% for positive and -1.36% vs -0.40% for negative news days). On the other hand, it
is also easy to imagine that for a small specialized company a single event, captured in
the news, can have a much greater impact on future prospects than for a large diversified
one. Large companies, however, also react significantly on news days.
When sorting on liquidity, proxied by the average daily trading volume, i.e. the
product of the number of shares traded and the average price during the day, the main
conclusion is that the news impact is not an artifact of trading fictions. Though less
liquid stocks react stronger than more liquid ones (1.27% vs 0.29% for positive and -
1.26% vs -0.31% for negative news days), the spread is actually smaller than in the case
of size, which suggests that liquidity is a less important factor. There might again be
some confusion with news coverage but it is rather limited as just under 40% of stocks
have the same assignment in this case.
For the remaining two sorts, the number of news does not play a significant role,
so the differences in news sensitivities are most likely not influenced by the content of
the news. Therefore, it seems that stocks with low book-to-market ratio (calculated
by dividing the book value of equity reported for the end of a given year through the
average market capitalization during that year) and high total volatility (average daily
squared return) are indeed more sensitive to news. In the case of low book-to-market
stocks, this might be due to the fact that they are effectively more leveraged, so any
news affecting the expected value of their assets will have a greater impact on their
valuation. The case of high volatility stocks is more puzzling. According to Merton
(1987) model of market equilibrium with incomplete information, high volatility should
be a property of ”neglected stocks” that investors know little about. To the extent that
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the degree of awareness can be proxied by news coverage, my findings do not confirm
these predictions. In fact, news seems to contribute to volatility. A hint at the reasons is
perhaps given by the fact that high volatility stocks have the most negative news days,
roughly equal to the number of positive news days, whereas all other volatility quintiles
have more positive news days. The news might thus reflect the changing fortunes of
such stocks, which make them more volatile.
In sum, the cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that news sensitivities are greatest
among smaller, less liquid stocks, where it might also relate to the higher informational
content of infrequent news and among low book-to-market and volatile stocks, regardless
of the news frequency. Most importantly however, the results are a strong indication
that significant reactions to news are a general phenomenon, not confined to any special
subset of stocks.
C Industry comparison
The industry comparison also yields interesting insights (Table V). First of all,
there is no significant variation in the average number of news days among industries,
despite substantial differences in market capitalization. Furthermore, all industries react
significantly to news, though there is considerable heterogeneity, which appears weakly
correlated with size or news coverage. For instance, utility stocks which are among the
smallest on average have also the smallest news sensitivities, while technology stock,
among the largest, react much stronger. The heterogeneity also does not seem to follow
the lines on any of the common industry divisions like cyclical vs. defensive or innovative
vs. traditional. Clearly, some industries just have higher news sensitivity than others.
Table V around here
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Another interesting feature of the results is that some industries appear to react
more strongly to negative news (financials, telecom), other to positive ones (healthcare,
oil and gas), while the rest has pretty symmetric reactions.5 Unless they are an artefact
of the observation period (a nice case would be to see what happens in the oil and gas
sector after the Macondo spill), these differences possibly reveal how investors weigh
chances and risks in the respective sectors.
III News sensitivity as a risk factor
The results of the analysis so far encourage the investigation whether differences in
short-term reactions to news translate into systematic differences in returns. In other
words, this section explores the possibility of framing news sensitivity as a risk factor,
affecting the cross-section of returns. Of course, news sensitivity can be reasonably
defined only for stocks that receive news in the firs place. Therefore, at the end of each
month only stocks with at least four news days of each type over the preceding 12-month
period are selected. This reduces the available sample size substantially, especially early
in the sample period, however between 25% and 63% of the stocks are still included.
To the extent that these stocks have more news coverage and are also likely the larger
ones and both of these features have been shown to reduce news impact, the selection
process biases against finding significant results.
In the next step, I regress the returns of each eligible stock on the market return and
the three news day dummies. The separate regressions are necessary to obtain individual
parameter estimates for each stock. The average magnitude of the parameters on the
dummy variables is then the news sensitivity score of that stock. Repeating the above
procedure every month yields a monthly ranking of the eligible stocks based on their
5The financial crisis does not seem to be a decisive explanatory factor of this effect.
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average news sensitivity over the preceding rolling 12-month window. To the extent that
the same news days can flow into the regression equation for a given stock over several
months, these rankings (and the resulting portfolio returns) will be autocorrelated. Con-
ceptually, this does not appear any different from the standard price-based momentum
case, where overlapping returns are used, so similarly to momentum studies I apply a
Newey-West correction for up to 12 lags to mitigate this effect.
The final step is to build equally weighted portfolios by taking quintiles of the news
sensitivity ranking. These portfolios are held for one month and then rebalanced. The
risk premium in question is simply the monthly return on a portfolio that goes long
high-news sensitivity stocks (top quintile) and short the low-news sensitivity (bottom
quintile) stocks. The monthly return on this portfolio is significantly positive and quite
persistent (mean: 0.95%, Newey-West t-stat: 2.67). It is also quite insensitive to the
inclusion of well-known risk factors (Table VI). The alpha from the four-factor model
controlling for the market excess return, size, book-to-market and momentum is only
slightly lower than the time series mean.
Table VI around here
The factor loadings provide interesting insights. The fact that the returns of the long-
short portfolio co-move with the market returns is not obvious, given that the largest
stocks are likely to be in the short leg. Rather, the news-sensitive stocks respond more
to news that also move the market. The positive loading on size and negative (though
mostly insignificant) loading on book-to-market confirm earlier findings that it is smaller
and growth stocks that react most strongly to news. The significantly negative loading
on momentum is interesting. It appears that low-news sensitivity stocks, which form
the short leg of the portfolio, tend to exhibit momentum behavior. Given that such
stocks react, by definition, weakly on news days this is suggestive of the ”underreaction
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to news” explanation of the momentum puzzle. However, it might also be an artefact
of the frequently cited short-term reversal of momentum stocks. Some evidence of it
is contained in the (unreported) fact that the loading on momentum loses significance
once longer holding periods are used.
Table VII around here
Using different holding periods is a way to robustify the initial result and this is
reported in Table VII. The fact that the risk premium is significant across holding
periods ranging from 1 month (as in the baseline specification) to 12 months is evidence
that the high-news sensitivity effect is not just a short-term phenomenon. In other
words, it is not likely to be due to short-term reactions to the news events themselves
but rather a stable cross-sectional effect, consistent with the risk factor interpretation.
Further support of the risk factor interpretation is given by the fact that the effect is
not confined to the extremes. Using tercile or median breakpoints essentially leads to
smaller estimated risk premia, which however remain significant across all types of factor
models and holding periods.
A Explaining the news sensitivity effect
Given the persistence of the news premium and its relative insensitivity to common
risk factors, the most interesting question is why it arises in the first place. Attempts
to answer this question are summarized in Table VIII. One explanation could be that
it is driven by certain firm characteristics. To check for this I compute news premia
for subsamples of stocks sorted on size, book-to-market and past 12-month return. For
these and all subsequent double-sorts I use median breakpoints for both the average news
sensitivity and the respective second dimension. It is on one hand the most conservative
approach, given that median breakpoints lead to the smallest news premium, and allows
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to maintain the largest sample size on the other. Using more extreme breakpoints would,
if anything, lead to more pronounced results.
Similarly to the news coverage effect identified by Fang and Peress (2009), the news
sensitivity effect is stronger in the lower size group if mean estimates are considered.
However, it also appears to be much more volatile among such stocks, because the
statistical significance is given only in one of the five cases. In the book-to-market case,
the news sensitivity effect is significant in both groups, however it is much larger for
value (i.e. high book-to-market) stocks. Along the past return dimension, the news
sensitivity effects is clearly concentrated among loser (i.e. low past return) stocks.
Table VIII around here
The greater news sensitivity effect among smaller stocks points to illiquidity as a
likely driver. To the extent that less liquid stocks are also less able to absorb shocks,
which could stem from the news, it is also a plausible explanation. In that case, one
should observe a larger news premium among less liquid stocks. Sorting stocks on
average trading volume during the past 12 months produces exactly this kind of result.
The news sensitivity premium is about three times as large among less liquid stocks,
thus illiquidity plays a significant role and can in particular explain the persistence of
the news sensitivity effect.
The fact that the news premium is more pronounced among value and loser stocks
gives a different hint. Value stocks are usually associated with poor earnings growth
and high distress risk, while loser stocks have by definition a poor record in their stock
prices. Both is pretty bad news to investors and to the extent that they anticipate more
bad news in the future, the will penalize stocks with high news sensitivity, because such
stocks would be hardest hit. This effect could be dubbed ”fear of bad news hypothesis”
and should lead to a stronger news sensitivity effect among stocks with higher likelihood
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of bad news. To capture the likelihood of future bad news directly, I use two measures
of past news sentiment, which hinges on the high autocorrelation typically exhibited by
news sentiment. The first measure is the ratio of positive to negative news days and the
second one is the fraction of positive news days in the total. Both are computed monthly
based on the past 12-month window. They are highly correlated but not identical,
differing in the treatment of neutral news. The ratio measure disregards them completely,
while the fraction measure includes them as an attenuation factor in the denominator.
In both cases, a stronger news sensitivity effect would be expected in the group with
low values of the measure. As it turns out, the differences are marginal and completely
insignificant for both measures. Either the ”fear of bad news” does not matter or the
proposed measures fail to capture it adequately.
A final possible explanation relates to the uncertainty surrounding a stock. If there
is little agreement concerning its prospects, then future news might have a dispropor-
tionately high impact, especially so for stocks already having a high news sensitivity.
Therefore, news sensitivity should be perceived as particularly risky in combination with
uncertainty. To proxy for uncertainty I use idiosyncratic volatility, measured relative to
the Fama-French three factor model, as in Ang et al. (2006), over a rolling 12-month
window prior to the observation month. This approach is reasonably successful with
the news sensitivity effect almost twice as large in the higher uncertainty group. It is
however also significant among stocks with lower uncertainty.
The overall conclusion is that the news sensitivity effect is quite pervasive and not
driven away by any other effect identified here. It seems however to arise as a results
of high uncertainty surrounding certain stocks and its persistence is made possible by
their relative illiquidity.
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IV Robustness checks
The primary purpose of this section is to confirm that the results on daily news
sensitivities are not spurious and also not too reliant on the particular specification.
Subsections A and B deal with the impact on the results of changing some aspects
of the original framework. Subsections C to E in turn investigate the possibility that
regressing returns on the news day dummy is in fact implicitly regressing on something
else. This is done by expanding the original panel regression with interaction terms
between the news day dummy and other potential sources of impact on returns.
ri,t = βM · rM,t +
3∑
k=−3
δposk ·Newsposi,t−k +
3∑
k=−3
δneutk ·Newsneuti,t−k +
3∑
k=−3
δnegk ·Newsnegi,t−k +
+
3∑
k=−3
γposk ·Newsposi,t−k ·Robi,t−k +
3∑
k=−3
γneutk ·Newsneuti,t−k ·Robi,t−k+
+
3∑
k=−3
γnegk ·Newsnegi,t−k ·Robi,t−k + i,t
(3)
The idea of the interaction terms is to take out any influence the additional factors could
have had on the initial news sensitivities. If the δ in the regression remain significant,
then this means the initial results were not driven by the factor in question. The factors
investigated are earnings announcements, past stock returns and the market return.
A Including afternoon news
News arriving after 2pm on a trading day, which I shall call afternoon news for short,
were eliminated from the original analysis. The decision was motivated by concern about
the high volume of ”no-content” news during that time and the subsequent positive bias
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it might introduce to the results. It is nonetheless revealing to test the impact of such
news directly. To this end the history of news days has to be reconstructed. News which
arrived during the last two trading hours are thus assigned to the same day, while those
which arrived after the close are assigned to the next. The estimated news sensitivities
turn out to be smaller than in the original specification. This indicates that much the
afternoon newsflow is actually noise with no clear direction and, in the absence of a
better way to identify ”no-content” news, the decision to cut it off was reasonable.
Table IX around here
B Changing the event window
Another potentially contentious feature of the model is the arbitrary length of the
event window. Its choice was motivated by the will to investigate the extent of pre- and
post-news activity on one hand and to limit overlaps between subsequent news events on
the other. The exact length of the event window should have no impact on the results, in
the sense that e.g. the estimate on the news day itself should not depend on if and how
many days before or after were also included, so it is instructive to let this parameter
vary. Looking at a range between 0 and +/- 5 days around the news day shows that the
estimated news sensitivities indeed are unaffected. This applies first of all to estimates
on the news days itself but also to the surrounding days as the event window is extended.
Therefore, the choice of the event window is not a salient feature of the model from the
econometric point of view and can be safely set to any convenient value.
C Earnings announcements
Earnings announcements are probably the most closely watched among company
news and their impact on the stock price is obvious and has been extensively studied.
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It is therefore possible that only this type of news matters and the rest is noise. To
control for this I interact the original news day dummy with another dummy variable
representing a 3-day event window around earnings announcements days as indicated in
I/B/E/S data. Whenever an earnings announcement takes place after market close, it
is counted for the next day. The interaction term effectively isolates the impact of those
news days, which are also earnings announcements days.
As was to be expected, earnings announcements are very important, as reported
in the second section of Table ??, although other news days remain statistically and
economically significant. Positive earnings announcements days have an impact, which
is almost 1% higher than other news days and the difference is even larger for negative
news days. Interestingly, neutral earnings announcements days have a clearly negative
tilt compared to other neutral news days. Another striking feature is the huge amount
of discovery, which takes place the day before the earnings get announced and accounts
for around 40% of the total impact.
Table X around here
D Past returns
Controlling for past return of a stock is in fact another way of dealing with the ”no
content” news mentioned before. This is because in the simplest setting, positive news
days would just follow positive returns and negative news days would follow negative
returns. To check whether this is indeed the driving force behind news day returns, I
add the previous day return interacted with the news day dummy to the regression. The
results in section 4 of Table ?? indicate that a small part of the previous day’s return
is reversed on positive and neutral news days and there seems to be some continuation
after neutral news days but the magnitude of these effects is minor. Overall, the previous
29
day return does not seem to be an important factor in explaining the impact of news.
E Market return
Including an interaction term between the market return and the news day dummy
might seem superfluous, given that market return is already present in the regression.
However, there is a difference between the two. The parameter estimate on the market
return variable accounts for the beta of the stock over the entire sample period. The
parameter estimate on the interaction term by contrast accounts for the beta of the news
days and thus controls for the possibility that returns on news days are just outsized
reactions to the market return. Due to the fact that both variables are present in the
regression, the parameter estimate on the interaction term in fact gives the difference
between the beta of news days as compared to the average beta of the stock.
The results show that news days (and to some extent the surrounding days) do
indeed have higher betas. This effect is particularly pronounced for negative news days
where it is also spread over the whole event window. This indicates that the incidence
of negative news is more correlated with the general market development than in the
case of positive news.
V Impact of the financial crisis
The purpose of this section is to investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis
on the results, given that it covers a substantial part of the sample period. It is also
interesting to see how an event of this magnitude affected the news environment. To
this end I re-estimate all the panel regression including an interaction term between
the respective news dummy and the financial crisis variable, represented as a dummy
variable for the period January 2008 - December 2009. When exactly the financial crisis
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took place (or even whether it is already over) is of course a matter of contention and
any choice of time window will be by necessity arbitrary. A conservative approach would
be to choose a period where the effects of the crisis were most likely to bias my results.
The period of steep market fall and subsequent rally thus seems suitable.
Table XI around here
The general conclusion based on Table XI is that the financial crisis does not change
the qualitative conclusions drawn in the previous section. The significance of returns
on news days is not limited to the crisis period, although the impact of the crisis is
substantial in some cases. First of all, what seems to happen is that the gap between
positive and negative news increases. It is on one hand reasonable for a period of extreme
market conditions to be associated with more pronounced reactions to news. At the same
time it might be surprising that positive news were not being dismissed by investors.
Neutral news by contrast are basically unaffected, which confirms the initial intuition
that they are of relatively little interest.
VI Conclusions
Ever since the early study of Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) literature on news impact
has been struggling with the inability to distinguish between positive and negative news,
without raising suspicions of data snooping or running into data volumes impossible
to handle. Modern text-reading algorithms have created the possibility of processing
textual information on a virtually unlimited scale. In particular, this includes evaluating
the sentiment of text, based solely on its language, which is at the center of a whole
field called news analytics. Having an ex ante measure of the news sentiment, not
contaminated by any form of market feedback, is ideal for testing the impact of news on
stock returns and thus opens up a whole new frontier for research.
31
Employing a comprehensive database of all company-specific announcements aired
on the Thomson Reuters newswire in the period January 2003 - August 2010 this paper
takes full advantage of these possibilities. Each announcement in the dataset is linked
to a company and evaluated on its sentiment, relevance and several other dimensions.
Focusing on a broad selection of US stocks, I construct a daily history of positive,
neutral and negative news days for each stock in the sample, based either on all news
or just headlines. In the first step, the idea is to test whether returns on news days are
significantly different than returns on no-news days and whether the direction of the
difference agrees with the observed news sentiment. The results from a robust panel
regression confirm both points. Returns on positive news days are significantly above
the average across stocks, while those on negative news days are significantly below. The
effect is surprisingly symmetric, indicating that investors do not pay more attention to
negative news. Neutral news days are associated with statistically significant positive
returns, which are however of minor economic importance. This part of the analysis
also shows that pooling news days together regardless of their sentiment is effectively
like using only on neutral news days.
The cross-sectional analysis confirms that news are an important factor irrespective
of various company characteristics or industry classification. There are, however, sub-
stantial differences along these dimensions, some of which link back to news coverage
(size), while others point out to a greater news sensitivity of certain stocks (e.g. growth
or technology stocks).
Most importantly, news sensitivity itself appears to be an important company charac-
teristic with a risk factor interpretation. Stocks with high news sensitivity consistently
outperform stocks with low sensitivity by a statistically and economically significant
amount, even after traditional risk factors are accounted for. The most likely explana-
tion places the source of this risk premium with the fact that for highly news sensitive
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stocks future and uncertain news can have a significant impact on their future prospects.
Supporting evidence shows a higher news sensitivity premium among stocks with higher
general uncertainty.
Further research should focus most of all on cementing the general results shown
in this paper, for example by breaking down the impact by different news types, news
topics or conditioning on different market environments. The news analytics methods
are also spilling over to other asset classes, like commodities and bonds, which opens up
new markets to this novel research.
33
References
Ang, A., R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and H. Zhang, 2006: The cross-section of volatility and
expected returns. Journal of Finance, 61 (1), 259–299.
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller, 2006: Robust inference with multi-way
clustering. NBER Working Paper.
Chan, W., 2003: Stock price reactions to news and no-news: Drift and reversal after
headlines. Journal of Financial Economics, 70 (2), 223–260.
Davis, A., J. Piger, and L. Sidor, 2006: Beyond the numbers: An analysis of optimistic
and pessimistic language in earnings press releases. Working paper, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
Fang, L. and J. Peress, 2009: Media coverage and the cross-section of stock returns.
Journal of Finance, 64 (5), 2023–2052.
Groß-Klußman, A. and N. Hautsch, 2010: When machines read the news: using auto-
mated text analysis to quantify high frequency news-implied market reactions. Journal
of Empirical Finance, 18 (2), 321–340.
Gutierrez, R. and E. Kelley, 2008: The long-lasting momentum in weekly returns. Jour-
nal of Finance, 61 (1), 415–447.
Ince, O. and R. Porter, 2006: Individual equity return data from thomson datastream:
handle with care! Journal of Financial Research, 29 (4), 463–479.
Li, F., 2006: Do stock market investors understand the risk sentiment of corporate
annual reports? Working paper, University of Michigan.
Merton, R., 1987: A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete infor-
mation. Journal of Finance, 42 (3), 483–510.
Mitchell, M. and J. Mulherin, 1994: The impact of public information on the stock
market. Journal of Finance, 49 (3), 923–950.
Pang, B. and L. Lee, 2008: Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. Foundations and
Trends in Information Retrieval, 2 (1–2), 1–135.
Pang, B., L. Lee, and S. Vaithyanathan, 2002: Thumbs up? Sentiment classification us-
ing machine learning techniques. Proceedings of the Conference on Empirical Methods
in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP).
Patton, A. and M. Verardo, 2010: Does beta move with news? Firm-specific information
flows and learning about profitability. Working Paper.
34
Petersen, M., 2009: Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1), 435–480.
Ranaldo, A., 2007: Intraday market dynamics around public information arrivals. Stock
Market Liquidity: Implications for Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing, G. N.
Gregoriou and F. S. Lhabitant, Eds., John Wiley & Sons.
Sinha, N., 2010: Underreaction to news in the US stock market. SSRN Working Paper.
Storkenmaier, A., M. Wagener, and C. Weinhardt, 2011: Public information in frag-
mented markets. SSRN Working Paper.
Tetlock, P., 2007: Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the stock
market. Journal of Finance, 62 (3), 1139–1168.
Tetlock, P., 2010: Does public financial news resolve asymmetric information? Review
of Financial Studies, 23 (9), 3520–3557.
Tetlock, P., 2011: All the news that’s fit to reprint: Do investors react to stale informa-
tion? Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Tetlock, P., M. Saar-Tsechansky, and S. Macskassy, 2008: More than words: Quantifying
language to measure firms’ fundamentals. Journal of Finance, 63 (6), 1437–1467.
Thompson, R., C. Olsen, and R. Dietrich, 1987: Attributes of news about firms: An
analysis of firm-specific news reported in the wall street journal index. Journal of
Accounting Research, 25 (2), 245–274.
Yu, L., 2009: A survey on post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). 6th International
Conference on Service Systems and Service Management.
35
Figure 1: Short term news impact
The figure presents non-cumulated daily returns from 3 days before to 3 days after the news day
(day 0). Green lines represent positive news days, blue lines neutral news days and red lines negative
news days. Furthermore, following specifications are shown:
all - all news items
h - only headlines
ext - only news days with extreme sentiment (either based on all news or only headlines)
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Table I: Summary statistics: whole sample
Panel A of this table gives, for every year in the sample, (2) the number of stocks in the sample, (3)
the median market capitalization in billions of USD, (4) the median book-to-market ratio, (5) the
number of stocks, which had at least one news day during that year, (6) - (8) the number of stocks
which had at least one news day with the respective sentiment during that year, and finally (9) -
(11) the average number of news days per stock during that year, broken down by sentiment.
Panel B presents the average number of news days per year and per stock depending on the news
specification used and broken down by sentiment. ”Headlines” includes only days, which featured
headline news about a stock (but also if there were other, ”non-headline” news on the same day),
”non-headlines” includes only days without a headline. Extreme sentiment is understood as the
weighted sentiment on a given news day exceeding 0.5 in magnitude. The right-hand side presents
the corresponding average sentiments.
Panel A: company-specific news days by year
No. of Market Book- Avg. number of news days per stock
Year stocks cap ($ bln) to-market Positive Neutral Negative
2003 780 2.74 0.54 8.71 10.56 10.84
2004 806 3.57 0.46 8.91 10.63 9.55
2005 848 4.18 0.42 10.15 14.34 9.25
2006 882 4.67 0.39 11.18 15.44 9.49
2007 913 5.46 0.36 11.43 18.61 9.63
2008 933 4.43 0.43 11.42 20.16 13.39
2009 945 3.46 0.59 12.19 21.93 12.88
2010 946 4.63 0.44 9.03 16.30 8.29
(till Aug.)
Panel B: average number of news days and average sentiment by news specification
News Avg. number of news days Avg. sentiment
specification Total Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
All news 33.7 9.6 15.1 9.0 0.61 0.03 -0.63
Headlines 20.9 6.6 9.3 5.0 0.65 0.04 -0.68
Non-headlines 12.8 4.1 3.9 4.8 0.61 0.03 -0.65
Extreme sentiment 13.2 6.5 6.7 0.68 -0.70
Headlines +
extreme sentiment 9.4 5.2 4.1 0.71 -0.74
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Table II: Short term news impact: whole sample
The table presents average daily returns around news arrivals computed as the difference to the average non-news daily
return for all stocks in the sample (news sensitivities). The news sensitivities are estimated from a panel regression of
daily returns on the news dummy, for positive, neutral or negative news respectively, allowing for arbitrary clustering
of standard errors along the firm and time dimensions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Contemporaneous market
return is included as a control variable (not reported). Day 0 is the news arrival day.
Significance levels: * - 0.05, ** - 0.01
By sentiment By sentiment intensity
News All news Positive Neutral Negative Extreme Extreme
specification Day days news days news days news days positive negative
All news -3 -0.01% * -0.03% ** 0.00% 0.01% -0.02% 0.00%
( -2.38 ) ( -3.77 ) ( 0.45 ) ( 0.59 ) ( -1.80 ) ( 0.38 )
0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%
( -0.35 ) ( 1.14 ) ( -0.52 ) ( -0.03 ) ( 1.39 ) ( 0.58 )
0.01% 0.06% ** 0.02% ** -0.09% ** 0.06% ** -0.08% **
( 0.76 ) ( 5.92 ) ( 2.87 ) ( -7.58 ) ( 4.79 ) ( -6.01 )
0 0.12% ** 0.45% ** 0.10% ** -0.41% ** 0.43% ** -0.35% **
( 11.25 ) ( 21.36 ) ( 9.42 ) ( -21.11 ) ( 20.01 ) ( -17.12 )
-0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
( -0.84 ) ( -1.22 ) ( -0.85 ) ( 0.81 ) ( -0.81 ) ( -1.31 )
-0.03% ** -0.03% ** -0.02% * 0.03% ** -0.02% 0.03% *
( -4.31 ) ( -3.42 ) ( -2.49 ) ( 2.92 ) ( -1.55 ) ( 2.37 )
+3 0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.06% ** 0.00% 0.05% **
( 1.12 ) ( -1.50 ) ( -1.74 ) ( 6.02 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 4.70 )
Headlines -3 -0.01% ** -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
( -2.83 ) ( -1.38 ) ( -0.81 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 0.55 )
0.00% 0.02% * 0.00% -0.02% 0.03% ** -0.02%
( -0.90 ) ( 2.15 ) ( 0.16 ) ( -1.26 ) ( 2.67 ) ( -1.28 )
0.00% 0.12% ** 0.01% -0.14% ** 0.15% ** -0.15% **
( -0.71 ) ( 9.77 ) ( 1.68 ) ( -7.70 ) ( 11.00 ) ( -7.60 )
0 0.10% ** 0.64% ** 0.12% ** -0.69% ** 0.70% ** -0.68% **
( 11.79 ) ( 22.37 ) ( 8.02 ) ( -21.64 ) ( 22.86 ) ( -18.09 )
-0.01% * 0.00% 0.01% -0.01% 0.00% -0.02%
( -2.10 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 1.00 ) ( -1.00 ) ( 0.01 ) ( -1.37 )
-0.02% ** -0.03% * -0.02% -0.01% -0.03% * -0.02%
( -3.23 ) ( -2.57 ) ( -1.93 ) ( -0.67 ) ( -2.23 ) ( -1.15 )
-3 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.05% ** -0.01% 0.05% **
( 0.72 ) ( -1.29 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 3.71 ) ( -0.57 ) ( 3.24 )
Non-headlines -3 0.00% -0.01% 0.03% ** -0.02%
( -0.19 ) ( -0.93 ) ( 2.64 ) ( -1.28 )
0.00% 0.00% 0.02% -0.02%
( 0.02 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 1.57 ) ( -1.22 )
-0.01% 0.02% 0.01% -0.04% **
( -1.10 ) ( 1.34 ) ( 0.38 ) ( -2.94 )
0 0.03% ** 0.17% ** 0.06% ** -0.17% **
( 3.32 ) ( 10.44 ) ( 4.03 ) ( -10.51 )
-0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.00%
( -1.07 ) ( -0.71 ) ( -0.45 ) ( -0.22 )
0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% **
( 1.86 ) ( -0.14 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 2.75 )
0.00% 0.02% -0.03% * 0.02%
+3 ( 0.45 ) ( 1.23 ) ( -2.08 ) ( 1.51 )
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Table III: Summary statistics: cross section
The table presents summary statistics for quintiles of stocks grouped by different company
characteristics. Each panel gives gives the average value of the respective characteristic for
each quintile as well as the average number of news days per year and per stock in that
quintile, broken down by news sentiment.
Mean Number of news days per stock
Group value Positive Neutral Negative
Panel A: news coverage
1 (low) 5.2 1.7 2.3 1.2
2 11.1 3.7 4.8 2.6
3 16.2 5.2 7.4 3.6
4 24.8 7.7 11.3 5.8
5 (high) 46.9 14.1 20.2 12.6
Panel B: market capitalization ($ bln)
1 (small) 1.26 3 4.5 2.9
2 2.45 4.1 5.8 3.2
3 4.11 4.9 7 4
4 8.66 6.9 10 5.3
5 (large) 45.8 12.6 17 10
Panel C: daily trading volume ($ mln)
1 (low) 9.4 2.5 3.6 1.9
2 21.2 3.6 5.3 2.7
3 40.7 4.9 7 3.7
4 79.7 6.8 9.6 5.3
5 (high) 273.7 11.8 15.5 9.6
Panel D: book-to-market ratio
1 (growth) 0.08 7.3 9.1 5
2 0.29 6.7 8.8 5.1
3 0.41 6.3 8.5 4.8
4 0.56 6.3 9.2 5.2
5 (value) 0.88 5.5 9 5.7
Panel E: total volatility (% p.a.)
1 (low) 22.8% 7 9.5 4.7
2 32.3% 6.5 8.9 4.6
3 36.1% 6.4 8.7 5
4 45.7% 6 8.4 5
5 (high) 62.6% 6 9.2 6.2
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Table IV: Short term news impact: cross section
The table presents average news sensitivities in the cross-section, using only headline news
items. News sensitivities are the difference of the average return on news days to the
average no-news daily return. Stocks are grouped into quintiles according to various cross-
sectional features and all quintiles are updated annually. The news sensitivities are estimated
separately for each quintile from a panel regression of daily returns on the news day dummy,
for positive, neutral or negative news days respectively, allowing for arbitrary clustering of
standard errors along the firm and time dimensions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Contemporaneous market return is included as a control variable (not reported).
Significance levels: * - 0.05, ** - 0.01
News day sentiment
Group yyy Positive Neutral Negative
Whole sample 0.64% ** ( 22.37 ) 0.12% ** ( 8.02 ) -0.69% ( -21.64 )
Panel A: news coverage
1 (low) 1.45% ** ( 14.9 ) 0.24% ** ( 3.18 ) -1.55% ** ( -10.9 )
2 1.17% ** ( 15.1 ) 0.24% ** ( 3.80 ) -1.17% ** ( -10.4 )
3 1.04% ** ( 17.2 ) 0.17% ** ( 3.84 ) -1.23% ** ( -14.2 )
4 0.77% ** ( 17.9 ) 0.10% ** ( 3.19 ) -0.89% ** ( -14.0 )
5 (high) 0.35% ** ( 11.9 ) 0.05% ** ( 2.64 ) -0.39% ** ( -10.4 )
Panel B: market capitalization
1 (small) 1.65% ** ( 17.21 ) 0.29% ** ( 3.79 ) -1.36% ** ( -10.2 )
2 1.10% ** ( 14.0 ) 0.26% ** ( 3.95 ) -1.23% ** ( -12.7 )
3 0.88% ** ( 16.4 ) 0.11% * ( 2.37 ) -1.09% ** ( -13.7 )
4 0.71% ** ( 16.1 ) 0.09% ** ( 2.76 ) -0.73% ** ( -11.4 )
5 (large) 0.36% ** ( 12.4 ) 0.05% ** ( 2.78 ) -0.40% ** ( -10.5 )
Panel C: trading volume
1 (low) 1.20% ** ( 13.8 ) 0.29% ** ( 4.37 ) -1.07% ** ( -8.33 )
2 1.00% ** ( 14.7 ) 0.22% ** ( 3.85 ) -1.19% ** ( -12.7 )
3 0.92% ** ( 15.7 ) 0.12% * ( 2.39 ) -1.04% ** ( -12.7 )
4 0.76% ** ( 15.2 ) 0.09% ** ( 3.14 ) -0.81% ** ( -12.2 )
5 (high) 0.44% ** ( 11.8 ) 0.05% ** ( 2.62 ) -0.48% ** ( -10.3 )
Panel D: book-to-market
1 (growth) 0.87% ** ( 12.4 ) 0.15% ** ( 4.29 ) -0.85% ** ( -9.86 )
2 0.80% ** ( 13.5 ) 0.07% * ( 2.06 ) -0.80% ** ( -10.3 )
3 0.72% ** ( 14.9 ) 0.10% ** ( 2.92 ) -0.73% ** ( -12.1 )
4 0.58% ** ( 12.4 ) 0.06% * ( 2.07 ) -0.69% ** ( -9.38 )
5 (value) 0.51% ** ( 9.31 ) 0.17% ** ( 3.79 ) -0.68% ** ( -8.63 )
Panel E: total volatility
1 (low) 0.29% ** ( 11.9 ) 0.06% ** ( 3.43 ) -0.31% ** ( -9.28 )
2 0.49% ** ( 15.2 ) 0.13% ** ( 5.43 ) -0.51% ** ( -9.61 )
3 0.75% ** ( 18.6 ) 0.09% ** ( 3.08 ) -0.68% ** ( -13.2 )
4 0.85% ** ( 16.8 ) 0.09% * ( 2.17 ) -0.90% ** ( -13.9 )
5 (high) 1.27% ** ( 14.2 ) 0.18% ** ( 2.81 ) -1.26% ** ( -11.2 )
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Table VI: Risk factor regressions
In this table monthly returns of a portfolio going long the top quintile of most
news-sensitive stocks and short the bottom quintile of least news-sensitive stocks
are regressed on common risk factors. News sensitivity is defined over the preceding
rolling 12-month window. Both the long and short positions are equally weighted,
and held for 1 month after portfolio formation. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly.
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, * and ** indicate statistical significance at
the 10% and 5% level respectively.
Time series Fama-French Carhart Pastor-Stambaugh
mean CAPM three-factor four-factor five-factor
Intercept 0.95 ** 0.89 ** 0.85 ** 0.84 ** 0.84**
( 2.67 ) ( 3.49 ) ( 3.69 ) ( 3.82 ) (3.96)
Mkt-Rf - 0.47 ** 0.39 ** 0.35 ** 0.35**
( 10.3 ) ( 10.2 ) ( 9.22 ) (9.55)
SMB - - 0.49 ** 0.51 ** 0.50**
( 4.63 ) ( 5.00 ) (4.56)
HML - - -0.10 -0.17 * -0.19
( -1.07 ) ( -1.75 ) (-1.40)
UMD - - - -0.12 ** -0.12**
( -2.69 ) (-2.34)
LIQ V - - - - -0.03
-0.62
No. obs. 80 80 80 80 80
Adj. R2 - 0.4 0.55 0.67 0.67
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Table VII: Different breakpoints and holding periods
In this table monthly returns of a portfolio going long the most news-sensitive stocks
and short the least news-sensitive stocks are evaluated with respect to different
breakpoints and holding periods. News sensitivity is defined over the preceding
rolling 12-month window. Both the long and short positions are equally weighted.
The numbers are the times series mean and intercepts (alphas) from common risk
factors models. Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, * and ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
Holding Time series CAPM Fama-French Carhart Pastor-Stambaugh
period mean intercept intercept intercept intercept
Panel A: quintile breakpoints
1 month 0.95 ** 0.89 ** 0.85 ** 0.84 ** 0.84 **
( 2.67 ) ( 3.49 ) ( 3.69 ) ( 3.81 ) ( 3.96 )
3 months 0.72 ** 0.67 ** 0.62 ** 0.62 ** 0.57 **
( 2.11 ) ( 2.74 ) ( 2.98 ) ( 2.97 ) ( 3.13 )
6 months 0.65 * 0.59 ** 0.56 ** 0.56 ** 0.50 **
( 1.86 ) ( 2.37 ) ( 2.71 ) ( 2.69 ) ( 2.83 )
12 months 0.52 0.47 * 0.46 ** 0.46 ** 0.36 **
( 1.51 ) ( 1.81 ) ( 2.17 ) ( 2.17 ) ( 2.08 )
Panel B: tercile breakpoints
1 month 0.67 ** 0.66 ** 0.63 ** 0.62 ** 0.60 **
( 2.47 ) ( 2.5 ) ( 3.3 ) ( 3.87 ) ( 3.99 )
3 months 0.57 ** 0.53 ** 0.50 ** 0.50 ** 0.47 **
( 2.05 ) ( 2.73 ) ( 3.68 ) ( 3.63 ) ( 4.00 )
6 months 0.52 * 0.48 ** 0.46 ** 0.46 ** 0.41 **
( 1.85 ) ( 2.48 ) ( 3.29 ) ( 3.22 ) ( 3.31 )
12 months 0.45 0.41 ** 0.40 ** 0.40 ** 0.33 **
( 1.60 ) ( 2.25 ) ( 2.96 ) ( 3.04 ) ( 2.72 )
Panel C: median breakpoints
1 month 0.53 ** 0.49 ** 0.46 ** 0.46 ** 0.44 **
( 2.46 ) ( 2.59 ) ( 3.52 ) ( 4.32 ) ( 4.26 )
3 months 0.42 ** 0.38 ** 0.35 ** 0.35 ** 0.35 **
( 2.03 ) ( 2.98 ) ( 4.01 ) ( 4.15 ) ( 4.36 )
6 months 0.36 * 0.32 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 ** 0.28 **
( 1.77 ) ( 2.52 ) ( 3.39 ) ( 3.34 ) ( 3.32 )
12 months 0.30 0.26 ** 0.24 ** 0.24 ** 0.20 **
( 1.51 ) ( 2.20 ) ( 3.00 ) ( 3.04 ) ( 2.46 )
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Table VIII: Explanations of the news sensitivity effect
The table examines the news sensitivity premium in subsamples of stocks sorted on
various firm characteristics (Panels A to C) and proxies for possible explanations:
liquidity (Panel D), likelihood of bad news (Panels E and F) and uncertainty (Panel
G). The numbers are the times series mean and intercepts (alphas) from common
risk factors models. Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses, * and ** indicate sta-
tistical significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
Time series CAPM Fama-French Carhart Pastor-Stambaugh
mean intercept intercept intercept intercept
Panel A: By size
Small 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.35 *
( 1.60 ) ( 1.18 ) ( 1.54 ) ( 1.61 ) ( 1.79 )
Big 0.28 0.24 ** 0.24 ** 0.24 ** 0.25 **
( 1.23 ) ( 2.05 ) ( 2.84 ) ( 2.59 ) ( 2.97 )
Panel B: By book-to-market
Low 0.40 * 0.37 ** 0.38 ** 0.38 ** 0.33 **
( 1.83 ) ( 2.50 ) ( 3.76 ) ( 3.63 ) ( 2.93 )
High 0.65 ** 0.60 ** 0.55 ** 0.54 ** 0.56 **
( 2.53 ) ( 2.69 ) ( 2.84 ) ( 4.06 ) ( 4.56 )
Panel C: By past 12-month return
Low 0.63 ** 0.60 ** 0.55 ** 0.55 ** 0.56 **
( 2.56 ) ( 2.23 ) ( 2.52 ) ( 3.24 ) ( 2.91 )
High 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.24 ** 0.20
( 1.18 ) ( 1.53 ) ( 1.63 ) ( 2.01 ) ( 1.59 )
Panel D: By average trading volume
Low 0.53 ** 0.50 ** 0.48 ** 0.48 ** 0.54 **
( 2.32 ) ( 2.04 ) ( 2.46 ) ( 2.68 ) ( 3.05 )
High 0.30 0.25 * 0.26 ** 0.25 ** 0.19 **
( 1.09 ) ( 1.89 ) ( 2.75 ) ( 2.90 ) ( 2.10 )
Panel E: By ratio of positive to negative news days
Low 0.58 ** 0.54 ** 0.50 ** 0.50 ** 0.48 **
( 2.45 ) ( 2.75 ) ( 2.46 ) ( 3.57 ) ( 3.27 )
High 0.52 ** 0.48 ** 0.45 ** 0.45 ** 0.46 **
( 2.11 ) ( 2.26 ) ( 2.75 ) ( 3.40 ) ( 3.60 )
Panel F: By fraction of positive news days in total
Low 0.53 ** 0.49 ** 0.47 ** 0.46 ** 0.44 **
( 2.39 ) ( 2.60 ) ( 3.01 ) ( 3.37 ) ( 2.98 )
High 0.51 ** 0.47 ** 0.44 ** 0.44 ** 0.45 **
( 2.16 ) ( 2.17 ) ( 2.93 ) ( 3.54 ) ( 3.87 )
Panel G: By idiosyncratic volatility
Low 0.32 ** 0.31 ** 0.30 ** 0.29 ** 0.24 **
( 1.97 ) ( 2.76 ) ( 3.00 ) ( 2.98 ) ( 2.51 )
High 0.51 ** 0.50 ** 0.48 ** 0.48 ** 0.51 **
( 2.96 ) ( 2.12 ) ( 2.47 ) ( 3.10 ) ( 2.82 )
Table IX: Robustness checks: part 1
The first robustness check covered in this table (Panel A) relates to the sensitivity
of the results to including news arriving after the previously imposed threshold of
two hours before the close. Such news is counted for the trading next day. The
second check examines the sensitivity of the parameter estimates on news days to
changing the length of the event window (Panel B). Only headline news items are
used in both cases.
Panel A: results including afternoon news
Day Positive news days Neutral news days Negative news days
-3 0.01% ( 1.44 ) 0.01% ( 1.51 ) -0.04% ** ( -3.81 )
0.04% ** ( 4.01 ) -0.01% ( -0.85 ) -0.05% ** ( -3.92 )
0.11% ** ( 10.49 ) 0.00% ( 0.54 ) -0.16% ** ( -10.09 )
0 0.57% ** ( 26.19 ) 0.09% ** ( 8.37 ) -0.56% ** ( -21.37 )
0.08% ** ( 7.34 ) 0.05% ** ( 4.31 ) -0.09% ** ( -5.88 )
-0.02% ( -1.66 ) -0.02% ** ( -2.84 ) -0.05% ** ( -4.11 )
+3 0.01% ( 0.95 ) 0.00% ( 0.53 ) 0.02% ( 1.51 )
Panel B: sensitivity to the length of the news window
News Length of event window
days 5-days 4-days 3-days 2-days 1-day None
Positive 0.69% ** 0.69% ** 0.68% ** 0.68% ** 0.68% ** 0.68% **
( 25.83 ) ( 25.82 ) ( 25.73 ) ( 25.67 ) ( 25.56 ) ( 25.49 )
Neutral 0.13% ** 0.13% ** 0.12% ** 0.12% ** 0.12% ** 0.12%**
( 9.28 ) ( 9.28 ) ( 9.15 ) ( 9.15 ) ( 8.97 ) ( 8.86 )
Negative -0.68% ** -0.68% ** -0.69% ** -0.69% ** -0.69% ** -0.70% **
( -20.92 ) ( -21.01 ) ( -21.15 ) ( -21.26 ) ( -21.45 ) ( -21.86 )
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Table X: Robustness checks: part 2
The table presents average daily returns around news arrivals computed as the difference to the average non-news
daily return, estimated from a panel regression of daily returns on the news dummy, for positive, neutral or negative
news days respectively, and including interactions with the following control variables:
• Earni,t−day - dummy variables for earnings announcements event window (+/- 3 days)
• ri,t−(day−1) - previous day return for all days in the event window
• rM,t−day - contemporaneous market return for all days in the event window
The first section of the table contains parameter estimates on the news day dummies (news sensitivities), while sections
2-4 contain parameter estimates on the interactions between the news day dummy and the respective control variable.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses are computed allowing for arbitrary clustering of standard errors along the firm and
time dimensions. Day 0 is the news arrival day. Only headline news items are used.
Significance levels: * - 0.05, ** - 0.01
Day yyy Positive news Neutral news Negative news
δi,t−day -3 0.00% ( -0.11 ) 0.02% ** ( 2.64 ) -0.01% ( -1.20 )
0.03% ** ( 3.83 ) 0.00% ( 0.70 ) -0.03% ** ( -2.90 )
0.05% ** ( 5.77 ) 0.02% ** ( 2.86 ) -0.08% ** ( -7.49 )
0 0.38% ** ( 21.77 ) 0.09% ** ( 8.91 ) -0.29% ** ( -16.63 )
0.02% ** ( 2.60 ) 0.00% ( 0.58 ) -0.04% ** ( -4.10 )
0.00% ( -0.17 ) -0.01% * ( -2.14 ) -0.02% * ( -2.52 )
+3 0.00% ( -0.58 ) -0.01% ( -1.76 ) -0.01% ( -0.65 )
Earni,t−day -3 0.20% ( 0.92 ) -0.12% ( -0.76 ) 0.00% ( -0.01 )
0.20% ( 1.07 ) -0.03% ( -0.21 ) -0.38% ( -1.93 )
0.67% ** ( 4.88 ) -0.19% ( -1.56 ) -1.00% ** ( -6.32 )
0 0.94% ** ( 7.63 ) -0.18% * ( -2.19 ) -1.36% ** ( -8.29 )
0.00% ( -0.02 ) -0.02% ( -0.16 ) -0.17% ( -0.88 )
-0.13% ( -0.71 ) -0.24% ( -1.63 ) 0.22% ( 1.19 )
+3 0.17% ( 1.01 ) -0.10% ( -0.59 ) 0.28% ( 1.28 )
ri,t−(day−1) -3 0.011 ( 1.58 ) 0.006 ( 0.76 ) 0.000 ( 0.06 )
-0.010 ( -1.29 ) -0.002 ( -0.25 ) 0.017 * ( 2.00 )
0.000 ( 0.04 ) 0.007 ( 1.00 ) 0.011 ( 1.08 )
0 -0.023 ** ( -2.90 ) -0.019 * ( -2.09 ) 0.013 ( 1.49 )
0.007 ( 1.28 ) 0.016 ** ( 3.09 ) 0.011 ( 1.43 )
0.011 ( 1.54 ) -0.002 ( -0.29 ) 0.010 ( 1.05 )
+3 -0.010 ( -1.26 ) 0.018 ** ( 2.76 ) 0.002 ( 0.22 )
rM,t−day -3 0.010 ( 0.77 ) 0.017 ( 1.42 ) 0.044 ** ( 3.42 )
0.013 ( 1.07 ) -0.015 ( -1.32 ) 0.056 ** ( 3.78 )
0.040 ** ( 3.31 ) 0.026 * ( 2.34 ) 0.057 ** ( 4.24 )
0 0.039 ** ( 3.02 ) 0.031 * ( 2.48 ) 0.110 ** ( 7.26 )
-0.010 ( -0.74 ) -0.031 ** ( -3.02 ) 0.055 ** ( 3.50 )
-0.021 ( -1.79 ) -0.033 ** ( -2.99 ) 0.039 ** ( 2.97 )
+3 0.004 ( 0.29 ) -0.018 ( -1.90 ) 0.039 ** ( 2.73 )
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Table XI: Impact of the financial crisis
Panel A of the table presents the estimates of news sensitivities outside (δ) and during the
financial crisis (δ · cris), defined as the period Jan 2008 - Dec 2009.
Extreme sentiment
News days All news Headlines Non-headlines All news Headlines
Positive δ 0.44% ** 0.64% ** 0.17% ** 0.44% ** 0.69% **
(21.2) (22.4) (10.6) (20.1) (22.5)
δ · cris 0.09% ** 0.11% ** -0.01% -0.04% 0.09% **
( 2.95 ) ( 3.39 ) ( -0.17 ) ( -1.07 ) ( 2.44 )
Neutral δ 0.10% ** 0.12% ** 0.06% **
(9.41) (8.04) (4.23)
δ · cris -0.03% 0.00% -0.02%
( -1.46 ) ( -0.12 ) ( -0.42 )
Negative δ -0.36% ** -0.63% ** -0.13% ** -0.35% ** -0.70% **
(-18.4) (-18.5) (-8.69) (-17.2) (-18.7)
δ · cris -0.14% ** -0.17% ** -0.11% ** -0.06% -0.20% **
( -4.04 ) ( -3.55 ) ( -3.06 ) ( -1.64 ) ( -3.69 )
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